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ABSTRACT
This paper recounts the tale of a ‘Spurious Drugs Kingpin’ and his
scandalous business empire of relabelling and recirculating expired
medicines in the south Indian city of Chennai. At the time the story
broke, in the ﬁrst half of 2010, questions of drug safety dominated media
headlines and public discussion. However, a closer investigation suggests
a more complicated picture. While relabelling expired medicines was
certainly a crime, it is far from clear if their relabelling and subsequent
redistribution constituted a public health danger. If actually existing
unsafe drugs did not fuel this drug safety scandal, what did? I argue
this case illuminates two things: (1) the illusory nature of certainties
about drug safety and (2) how ambiguity about the safety of expired
drugs facilitates policing not of relations within the pharmacological
world, but instead of social and economic relations. This episode matters
because it illuminates how, within apparent attempts to police the safety
of circulation of drugs, drugs themselves are neither subject nor object,
but instead the ground upon which market battles are waged.
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Anatomy of a scandal
Chennai, the capital of the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, is a city thick with health care. Moving
around the network of roads that knits the city together, it often feels like some variety of hospital
sits on each and every street corner. Patients, or their family members, hurry from their homes,
small hospitals, and nursing facilities to the more than 42,000 pharmacies across the state, where
they buy physician-prescribed and over-the-counter medicines. Others buy their medicines from in-
house pharmacies run by so many of the private hospital chains. Drawing patients from near and
far, and long-renowned for its high quality of health care (Hodges, 2016), Chennai gets to work
looking after those who are sick.
So in March 2010, when the news broke that a three-year-old girl had died a few months earlier
after taking ‘antibiotics’ that her parents had bought from a pharmacy to treat her fever, the media
picked up the story and the scandal gripped the city for weeks (“CM’s strong dose to fake drug
units,” 2010; “Timeline,” 2010). Newspaper headlines and radio and television news outlets broad-
cast the bad news every day for more than a month: spurious (or ‘fraudulent’) drugs had found
their way into Chennai’s pharmacies. In response, city police carried out raids of homes and oﬃces.
Evidence mounted. And any early attention paid to the death of a little girl was overshadowed by
updates on the on-going search for the culprits. Early on, four lakh rupees’ worth (about $9000) of
suspect drugs were seized.1 The police declared that they were on a ‘war footing’ as they carried
out their search for suspects (Mallady, 2010).
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Before long, newspapers reported that the criminal masterminds were neither retail pharmacists
nor drug manufacturers. Instead, the police pointed to a network of distributors. By the end of
May 2010, the police had 12 people in custody. They were charged with forgery and cheating
oﬀenses (“Drug Company Owner Surrenders,” 2010). The 12 included the man who was dubbed the
‘Spurious Drugs Kingpin’ by the city’s media and who was to become the ‘chief accused’ in the case.
Distributors are a largely invisible linchpin that connects consumers to drugs. They move drugs
from where they are manufactured to the retail outlets where they can be bought. Newspaper
articles alleged that the culprits, having properly collected expired, or nearly expired, drugs from
retailers, deviated from the law. As the story unfolded, readers were given a picture of
a sophisticated racket that precisely exploited the strict regulations that exist to protect consumers
from purchasing expired drugs.
Under the terms of India’s Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act 2008, pharmaceutical
retailers are incentivized keep a close eye on the expiry dates printed on the packaging for the
products that they stock. All retailers are required to keep a box labelled ‘NOT FOR SALE’, in which
they store about-to-expire products. To guarantee that retailers incur no loss for unsold, expired
stock, the law mandates that manufacturers must arrange for the regular collection and disposal of
these items (Kannan & Hiddleston, 2010). Just as distributors bring drugs from the manufacturer to
the retailer, they also tread the circuit in reverse, collecting unsold drugs from retailers. However, in
this case, rather than disposing of these drugs as required, distributors re-labelled the drugs with
false expiry dates. They then redistributed these relabelled drugs, having illegally imprinted them
with longer shelf lives.
At the time the story broke, the urgency in the reporting turned on the immediate dangers that
these drugs presented to the consuming public. However, a closer investigation of this episode
suggests a more complicated picture. Oﬃcials at the state’s Drug Control Authority were quick to
reassure members of the public that, despite the tenor of the news coverage, none of the expired
drugs identiﬁed had reached pharmacies or been sold to consumers. Indeed, even the state’s Chief
Minister sought to calm the restive Legislative Assembly by reminding the elected members of the
distinction between expired drugs and poison (‘Expired drugs safer,’ 2010). Few believed them, and
one state legislator suggested that the sellers of the drugs in question should be punished by the
same laws that are used for the crime of ‘murder for gain’ (‘Who stands where,’ 2010). In the febrile
environment, one seemingly vital element in the story remained signiﬁcantly under-reported.
Whilst the distributors’ alleged actions were certainly illegal, as the Chief Minister’s comment
attempted to underscore, there was never any direct evidence put on display to show that these
redistributed drugs were in fact dangerous. Revisiting this scandal thus presents a puzzle: If the
public was not necessarily in danger, then what, exactly, was all the hue and cry about?
There is complicated evidence on the dangers of expired drugs (Tull, 2018). Many see them as
a kind of ‘least-worst’ option in resource-constrained settings. Despite Indian pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers being popularly referred to as the ‘pharmacy to the third world’, Indian pharmaceuticals –
particularly when circulating in African markets – are also regularly cast as suspect objects
(McLaughlin, 2012). Recent history shows India’s preoccupation with regulatory stringency regarding
drugs quality, for example refusing humanitarian donations of expired drugs in the wake of
a devastating earthquake in 2001 (Tull, 2018). The peculiar temporality of expired drugs thus presents
an excellent example of how ambiguity, rather than certainty, can underscore the cut-and-dried
safety advice that we have come to expect from public health policy and practice.
India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu, where this story unfolded, presents another level of
complexity. On the one hand, the state has for decades been lauded as a development leader
within India, boasting of some of the country’s best health indicators and being regularly singled
for eﬃciency in state government and health care delivery. On the other hand, the state is also
home to a buoyant private health sector; corporate health care managers explain that the market
conditions are ideal, and that health care in Tamil Nadu is seen by private investors as a ‘recession-
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proof industry’ (Hodges, 2013). Statistics reveal a great deal of morbidity, but not extraordinary
mortality; people are poor, but not too poor to be willing to pay for repeated treatments.
The suspects
Over the course of the media coverage of April and May 2010, individual characters emerged along
with the details of the scam.
One such suspect, Venkatesan, worked as a van driver for the drug distribution company in
question. Soon after being named by the media, Venkatesan surrendered to the police and detailed
his practices in oﬃcial statements to the authorities. These, in turn, fuelled media reports; readers
learned that it was Venkatesan who did the distributors’ work of collecting the expired, or nearly
expired, contents of the pharmacists’ NOT FOR SALE boxes. But instead of disposing them at the city
dump, as required by law, Venkatesan delivered them to a godown (warehouse) (Sujatha, 2010).
It turned out that Venkatesan was from Kodungaiyur, a district in the far north of Chennai that
houses the city’s largest and oldest municipal dump, the exact dump where the drugs were meant
to be disposed (Mallady, 2010). And within Kodungaiyur, he was from the Ezhil Nagar neighbour-
hood, a tightly packed and mainly residential area abutting the vast dump. Houses repurposed as
small workshops sit among the modest, if pukka [brick, rather than mud], homes that line its
narrow lanes. These include many businesses where workers sit alongside open gunnysacks full of
recovered scrap, sorting the materials into diﬀerent categories; these objects in turn fuel the area’s
many small manufacturing businesses that turn the city’s discards into sellable items (Hodges,
2013). Small vans like the one Venkatesan drove regularly move in and out of the area, collecting or
discharging stock.
Enter Ravi. Ravi also hailed from Ezhil Nagar.
Whereas Venkatesan collected the expired drugs, it was Ravi to whom Venkatesan delivered
them. Ravi then transported the drugs from Ezhil Nagar to Koyambedu (Mallady, 2010).
Koyambedu is on the western fringe of the city and is home to both the city’s largest fruit and
vegetable market as well as the city’s long-distance bus terminus. It is a dense transfer point for
goods and people, and it is where the drugs relabelling operation was located. In Koyambedu,
newspapers reported, there was a residential house, surrounded by a small walled compound
where workers repurposed the expired drugs, using chemicals to remove the manufacturers’ expiry
and batch dates printed on the foil, and then reprinting the packets with fresh dates. These drugs
would then be distributed to new retailers (Kannan & Hiddleston, 2010). According to Venkatesan’s
statements to the police, not only did the entire relabelling operation take place at the business
premises of a legitimate licensed distributor for the drugs – Meena Medical Agencies – owned by
Meenakshi Sundaram, it was masterminded by him, too.
The importance of being meenakshi sundaram, Spurious Drugs Kingpin
The burden of scandal fell unevenly.
Meenakshi Sundaram owned and operated the drugs distribution company that emerged at the
centre of the scandal, and he had gone on the run. In the following weeks’ media coverage, it
emerged that the police seized Rs1 (c $210,000)crore worth of drugs from the Kingpin’s storage
facilities.
Meenakshi Sundaram was already well known to the police (“Key Accused Surrenders,” 2010).
This 2010 episode was the third time in as many years that he had been sought in relation to
distributing spurious drugs (Vannan, 2010a). Earlier investigations suggested that he had been
distributing relabelled drugs to pharmacies in Tirunelveli, nearly 400 miles south of Chennai
(Vannan, 2010b).
Meenakshi Sundaram had swagger. Newspapers wrote lyrically about his life as a man-about-
town:
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From riding a moped to driving into the city’s Cosmopolitan Club in a Ford Endeavour SUV, Meenakshi
Sundaram, whose present worth is estimated to be over Rs 100 crore,2 has come a long way in 17 years. . . . He
owned three cars and struck deals with other businessmen at the Cosmopolitan Club on Anna Salai [the city’s
most established shopping district], where he was known to spend his evenings in the company of aﬄuent
and elite friends. Sundaram was conscious of his looks and made extra eﬀort to groom himself. He was dressed
immaculately and lived in style. In his two ﬂats in Chinmayanagar [an aﬄuent neighbourhood in the west of
Chennai], the police said, ‘Huge framed photographs of him adorn the walls of the posh apartments that have
a wide collection of luxurious goods. . . . His children go to elite schools’ (Vannan, 2010a).
Meenakshi Sundaram had ﬁnancing. He ‘operated eight bank accounts’ (The Hindu 2010).
Meenakshi Sundaram was the object of outrage. This included among oﬃcers of the court
(judges, attorneys, bailiﬀs, clerks). Newspapers reported:
In a shocking incident a group of about 20 advocates manhandled persons accused in a recently revealed case
of a ﬂourishing spurious drugs trade, and called aloud for their ‘hanging’, when they were brought to the
Egmore court on Wednesday, created a tense situation for about half an hour. As the policemen escorting
Meenakshi Sundaram . . . to the court played safe and refrained from using force to keep the lawyers at bay, the
accused ended up receiving punches and blows to the face and head . . . and [lawyers] declared that none
among them would represent the accused in court (‘Lawyers Play Judge,’ 2010).
Despite that fracas, Meenakshi Sundaram had connections. This repeated record of misbehaviour,
without apparent accountability, the papers reported, was due to his substantial ﬁnancial connec-
tions to a major politician in the state (‘Kingpin has Political Links,’ 2010).
***
Most media reporting on policing is structured like a traditional crime mystery, or ‘whodunit’.
Police announcements typically take place at speciﬁc points in the life cycle of on-going investiga-
tions: at the discovery of a crime and the opening of a case, upon bringing charges, at the
commencement of a trial. The identity of the mastermind is only revealed upon the completion
of a court case. Yet the case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin was no ‘whodunit’. Readers did not
yearn to learn the identity of the Kingpin, we were told at the outset. Instead, readers were pulled
in to the story through a daily drip of detail.
Whom did this drip-feed of normally conﬁdential detail serve? While Meenakshi Sundaram’s
personal habits and business practices were splashed across the media, there was next to no detail
about actual dangers to the public that the expired drugs may – or may not – have presented. Such
a state of aﬀairs suggests that it was neither pharmacological safety nor the health of the public
that was at the heart of this case. Instead, Chennai’s spurious drugs served as the ground on which
other matters were contested.
Other matters
Just as it seemed that the Kingpin was had secured his leading anti-hero role in this tale, there was
a twist. Unsettling questions surfaced in the media’s reporting. What of the state agencies tasked
with enforcing the existing regulations designed to keep drugs safe?
Readers also learned that the Kingpin (a distributor), had been identiﬁed by manufacturers (his
supplier) in successive years leading up to 2010. As one newspaper reported: ‘The [manufacturer],
on realizing that “Renerve” tablets with their expiry dates tampered with on the wrapper was being
sold in shops in February 2010, drew the attention of drug control authorities’ (‘”Renerve” Exposed
Fake Drugs,’ 2010). These manufacturers had urged state agencies to enforce their own regulations.
Another newspaper explained in greater detail:
rumours are already aﬂoat that a pharmaceutical company and the Tamil Nadu Health Department got wind of
the [spurious drugs racket] about a year before the complaint was ﬁled with the city police on 16 March.
According to a police source, the health department had called a meeting of drug stockists and their
distributors, which even alleged kingpin of the racket Meenakshi Sundaram attended, at the Directorate of
Medical Services and warned them of such activities. While Health Secretary V K Subburaj denied that such
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a meeting was held, a police oﬃcer gave the low-down of all that transpired behind closed doors. He said it all
started when [one manufacturer] found that the sales of its products of certain batch numbers showed
a sudden drop in Tamil Nadu. It immediately held its own investigations and found that the decline was
due to the circulation of spurious drugs of the company’s products, he added. The company’s oﬃcials declined
to comment (‘Was Govt Aware,’ 2010).
As media coverage of the scam continued, it came to light that India’s pharmaceutical manufac-
turers keep very close tabs on their sales ﬁgures. In this 2010 episode, a dip in sales alerted the
manufacturer that a product was likely no longer on the shelves, despite distributors’ counter-
claims that all was business as normal.
Manufacturers have a strong incentive to keep such matters under the radar to maintain both
their cash ﬂow and the integrity of their brand name. Newspapers reported earlier instances where
manufacturers had realised that the sales of various products had suddenly dipped and, in
response, informed the drug control authorities (Vannan, 2010b). These stories suggested that,
rather than the police or the state health authorities, manufactures’ concerns about sales ﬁgures
drove them to attempt to mobilise the state’s drug control agencies to action.
In the Chennai case, however, it seems that manufacturer’s attempts to move the state agencies
to act were ineﬀective; the meeting with the health minister did not achieve the results desired. It
is diﬃcult not to speculate that dissatisfaction at this turn of aﬀairs could have led to a Plan B – in
the form of a subsequent appeal to the Chennai city police commissioner. If that was the case, it
appears that the city police robustly complied with the manufacturer’s request, forming ‘three
special teams . . . to arrest the culprits’ (‘CM’s Strong Dose,’ 2010).
Further muddying the waters, stories abounded in the media that Meenakshi Sundaram had
ﬂourished in the pharmaceutical trade thanks to slush money provided by a family member of
a senior politician. As one paper reported:
The person who had provided support to him had reportedly called on a senior member of the state Cabinet
and requested the transfer of the case to the Central Bureau of Criminal Investigation Department (henceforth,
CB-CID) even though the Chennai police have been doing well by arresting or forcing to surrender most of the
key players involved in the distribution of spurious drugs (‘Kingpin Has Political Links?’ 2010).
It comes as no surprise, then, that the city police bridled when the Tamil Nadu state government
moved to regain control of the case. The Director General of Police (a state oﬃce) announced that,
given the cross-state nature of the alleged crimes, the case of Meenakshi Sundaram was to be
transferred from the city police to the all-India agency, the CB-CID (‘Kingpin Has Political Links?’
2010). For their part, the city police claimed that it was an attempt to ‘put the lid on a can of
worms’ (‘Kingpin Has Political Links?’ 2010).
What ﬁnally became of Meenakshi Sundaram? He denied all the charges against him. When
he ﬁnally faced the court, he did not remain in prison long before he was granted bail. Of the
ﬁve cases eventually ﬁled against him that have received judgments, no criminal charges
stuck (although one unrelated income tax matter was upheld).3 His business premises were
ordered by the courts to be unsealed.4 His license to trade as a pharmaceutical distributor
was restored.5 He was allowed to distribute the stock in his warehouses.6 Of the 12 suspects
who were held in connection with the scandal, it is only Meenakshi Sundaram’s name that
can be found in the legal record at all, leading one to surmise that all charges against the
others were also eventually dropped. Is this, then, the case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin
who got away?
Not according to Meenakshi Sundaram’s legal record, which suggests a man who fought not the
administration of justice, but unjust personal persecution. Although it was not granted, Meenakshi
Sundaram’s lawyers ﬁrst ﬁled anticipatory bail applications on his behalf. This is particularly
signiﬁcant because anticipatory bail is a provision in India’s criminal law allows for someone to
protect herself from being arrested, in the event false charges are ﬁled against them (typically
stemming from personal vendetta and intended only to harass the accused). Meenakshi
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Sundaram’s lawyers also ﬁled multiple writ petitions on his behalf, a form of legal redress that only
India’s High Courts can oﬀer, in the event that an individual’s civil liberties (in Indian legal parlance,
‘fundamental rights’) have been violated.
That is to say, none of the evidence produced in any of the cases against the Kingpin addressed
any question of the relative public danger of his alleged crimes. Why not? For the courts, spurious
drugs – eﬀectively an Indian legal term for a fraudulent business practice – is about a crime of theft
rather than a crime of danger (Srinivasan, 2010). Yet, in the newspaper coverage and public
discussion, the condemnation and the jitters were not in relation to rights being abridged, or
fraud in manufacture, but an imminent danger the public. How do we understand the distance
between the outrage of the scandal, concerned with life and death, and its legal status that frames
the accused as wrongly accused in merely a matter of business?
Spectacles are memorable for the appearance that they create, and in the case of the Spurious
Drugs Kingpin, the many newspaper photographs released of uniformed police standing over
drugs laid out on tables and ‘perp walks’ produced a story of excess being reined in. In sum, the
public scandal that illuminated Meenakshi Sundaram as a culprit and a kingpin, also illuminated
the broader public health enforcement bureaucracy and its relationships with the pharmaceutical
manufacturing industry, what Hornberger (2018) refers to as the ‘performative world of drug
security’. But while these were momentarily illuminated, they remained largely unexplored. The
police acted in the name of public safety, but they were protecting the interests of pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Upon closer examination, the case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin thus appears to
have been more about mobilizing a language of public safety in order to police the proﬁts of
pharmaceuticals, and less about the quality of these pharmaceuticals themselves.
The public in public safety
This tale of a Spurious Drugs Kingpin, idiosyncratic policing and ambiguous pharmaceuticals was
itself ultimately unresolved in the courts. What it did clearly produce was a corollary story of
mounting public anxiety. As one newspaper reported: ‘Over the past couple of weeks, enough has
been going on in Chennai to get its residents a little worried about whether they are getting
genuine, quality drugs when they are going to a pharmacy’ (‘Drug Case Suspect Held,’ 2010). The
spectre of an unsafe drugs supply spooked many in the city and appeared to override the
otherwise well-practiced social and economic divisions. Yet the feeling of urgency in response to
a perceived public health danger itself poses the question: Who was collected in this collective?
This story of spurious drugs was on my radar as I, too, was a Chennai resident in 2009 and 2010
and read the city’s newspapers that seemed to carry new revelations about the case on the front
pages of most days’ editions. During the early summer months of 2010, I spent a lot of time driving
around the city. One morning, as I tuned my car radio to one of the two or three FM stations that
employed chirpy young men and women disc jockeys to play the latest hits from Tamil cinema, the
DJ’s atypically worried voice caught my ear. In Tamil, she asked many times over the course of her
show, urging people to phone in, ‘Namma Chennaikkarangalakku, yenge ponalum, yenna pannalum,
poli marunthu pirachenaippathi pesikitterirukkom! Ithu oonmaiya? Poyya? Yarukku teriyum? Aiyo aiyo,
nammalakku payam! Ungallukku enna abipriyam?’ [Chennai-ites! Wherever we go, whatever we do,
we are all talking about this drugs scandal! Is it true? Is it just a rumour? Who actually knows? We
are all scared! What’s your view?]
Such talk made a change from the standard radio repartee. Until then, this DJ’s most incisive
observations had been conﬁned to debating listeners over which of Chennai’s cricket celebrities
deserved the title of Number One Heart-Throb. As the mercury started to climb in the hot season,
so, it seemed, did anxiety levels. Somehow, the everyday practices of local criminality – the
existence of which was regularly acknowledged but something that middle-class people rarely
expected to experience directly – had spilled over to threaten the aﬄuent Chennai whom the
station targeted as its audience.
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This was a populace who regularly consumed – or at least aspired to consume – the best health
that money can buy. Indeed, the city is home to Apollo Hospitals, India’s ﬁrst (and in 2010 arguably
still the most prestigious) ‘corporate’ hospital chain (Hodges, 2016). ‘We can’t trust drugs any-
where – even at Apollo!?’ came friends’ worried question, as we caught up over evening drinks on
the city’s rooftop verandas., Their questions rehearsed the radio DJ’s fears: was no one safe when it
came to Indian drugs? Although the middle classes were alarmed by this episode, this was very
much a case where, if indeed the drugs in question presented a clear and present danger to health,
the victims were most likely to be the city’s wage-labouring poor, not the salaried rich.
Why? First, the question of which drugs were allegedly being relabelled bears some investiga-
tion. Recall the death of a three-year-old – purportedly due to antibiotics that her parents bought
from their local pharmacy in a poor part of town. Yet antibiotics, although they are prescribed and
consumed across Chennai’s socio-economic gamut, played no role in the case of the Spurious
Drugs Kingpin. Instead, the relabelled products that the police seized were products such as liver
tonics for tiredness, pain killers and anti-rheumatics for achy joints, vitamin and mineral supple-
ments, and cough syrups (‘Rs 1 Cr Worth,’ 2010; Vannan, 2010a). These are taken to ameliorate the
symptoms of chronic conditions. They mask the structural aches and pains at the heart of what it is
to belong to the city’s working poor, who do their utmost to carry on going to work, regardless of
feeling run down or exhausted. And I use the term ‘working poor’ here advisedly; it is they who buy
these drugs. The destitute cannot aﬀord them.
Similarly, the working poor’s daily budgets rarely allow them to buy drugs to keep on hand;
chemists regularly accommodate customers’ requests to sell single doses by taking a pair of
scissors and cutting a tablet in its blister pack from a larger foil strip (‘Sell Drugs in Strips’, 2010).
In eﬀect, whatever the intent, pharmacists fulﬁlling these requests means that these customers
would ﬁnd it nearly impossible to check drugs’ expiry dates.
Both the radio DJs and my friends were clear: they were concerned about spurious drugs posing
a threat to their personal safety. How could one safeguard one’s own health, they asked, if
medicine, a key building block of health, is suspect? But I continued to wonder: what connected
my well-heeled friends in the city’s leafy southern suburbs to the site of the initial crime – a north
Chennai neighbourhood almost always preceded by the adjective ‘notorious’, and the only place
I have ever had an auto-rickshaw driver refuse to take me, for fear of his own safety?
A fake drugs scandal could arguably prompt a trenchant review of enduring global inequalities.
Yet, in the case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin, the poor constantly receded from view. And the
middle classes appear to have misrecognised dangers to the poor as dangers to themselves. Why?
The measure of their anxiety struck me as much larger than seemed warranted. What might
account for this misrecognition? Perhaps Chennai’s aﬄuent residents recognized their own spur-
ious drugs scandal as part and parcel of a diﬀerent story: the scourge of global pharmaceutical
counterfeiting.
The address of global health
At this point, it is useful to pull back the focus of our story, and consider this question of middle
class misrecognition against a diﬀerent scale of inquiry. For some time, India’s media horizon has
been awash with alarming stories about fake drugs (Quet, 2016). Headlines have included ‘New
counterfeiting report highlights worrying trends’ (Barnes, 2007), ‘Fake drug industry operates
openly’ (Shrivavasta & Narayana Kumar, 2007), ‘Most fake drugs pass every test’ (Shrivastava,
2007), ‘India becomes a hub for fake medicines’ (Lakshmi, 2010), ‘The fake drug industry is
exploding and we can’t do anything about it’ (Ossola, 2015), ‘Indians at higher risk of getting
fake drugs’ (Chandna, 2015), ‘Pills that kill’ (Annuncio et al., 2003). Most of these articles are in the
popular press and fail to cite research. Even the World Health Organization has long pointed out
the diﬃculty in getting accurate estimates about fake drugs: ‘information on the scale of the
problem is inadequate and there are no global studies conducted’ (WHO, 1999, p. 3).
CRITICAL PUBLIC HEALTH 479
Indeed, global norm-setting institutions have fallen short of providing clear guidance. Over the
past few decades, the world has witnessed an explosion of worry about fake drugs. Worries have
poured forth from global health researchers, policy makers, states, nongovernmental organizations,
health care workers, journalists, and, of course, consumers. All have raised the collective alarm
about the urgent and life-threatening dangers that these drugs potentially present. During these
decades, norm-setting bodies, such as the World Health Organization and World Trade
Organization, have found themselves in the middle of controversy when framing deﬁnitions of
diﬀerent kinds of non-normative pharmaceuticals: ‘counterfeit’, ‘expired’, ‘substandard’, ‘spurious’,
and so on. For individual consumers, however, the questions tend to be simpler. We ask ourselves:
Will this make me better? Is it safe?
Perhaps surprisingly given the relative paucity of hard data, research publications have also
followed this trend and regularly highlight India as a place where the drugs supply is of particular
concern. Some authors report that:
Over the past decade, the number of countries reporting falsiﬁed (fake, spuriously/falsely labelled/counterfeit)
medicines and the types and quantities of fraudulent drugs being distributed have increased greatly. The
obstacles in combatting falsiﬁed pharmaceuticals include . . . deﬁcient regulation and regulatory challenges,
especially in China and India where fake products often originate. (Nayyar et al., 2015, p. 113)
Another article in the Lancet announced: ‘The market in fake and substandard pharmaceuticals is
not unique to India. But one widely quoted WHO statistic places this country as the leader, with as
much as 35% of the world’s production’ (Chatterjee, 2001, p. 177). Nevertheless, the few studies
that exist have struggled to produce signiﬁcant evidence to substantiate these claims. Others have
suggested that the problem is not on a comparable scale to the rhetoric employed.
Anxiety about fake drugs produces a particular form of public health scandal, and rehearses a set of
spectacular forms: the perp walk, the drug bust, the worried chat. These accounts of Indian pharma’s
twenty-ﬁrst century history are saturated with stories from the coterminous rise of the global anti-
counterfeiting movement (Hornberger, 2018). They are coupled with expressions of worry manifest in
the quotes and headlines above, repeated over and over again by both expert and popular outlets.
Together, they suggest that to question the scourge that fake drugs present seems absurd, the doubt
itself dangerous. Yet in the case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin and his alleged empire of expiry,
questions of where danger actually lies and where blame should fall are far from clear.
The ambivalence of aﬄuent India’s ‘arrival’ also haunts middle-class Indians’ peculiar engagement
with this particular global public health imaginary. Through it, the Kingpin’s alleged practices – and the
enduring ambiguity of the danger/safety of expired energy tonics – transmogrify into the object of
global anti-counterfeiting surveillance, and the worries of the middle class toggle between
amisrecognition of their common cause with those from the notorious north Chennai neighbourhood,
Pulianthope, and an over-identiﬁcation with the global elite who consume news about the plethora of
fake pharmaceuticals. They further merge with a well-practiced distrust of the Indian state, a concern
that the state fails to protect the interests of its citizenry, which is shared by many Indians.
Alongside the popular circulation of international law lies a longer history of suspicion held by
Indians regarding the veracity of consumer commodities and trickster ﬁgures. Indeed the Hindi
slang for a fraudster was immortalised in the name of a popular Bollywood ﬁlm – Shree 420. 1955.
Dir Raj Kapoor in which the eponymous character is named in homage to Section 420 of the Indian
Penal Code: the law for fraudsters. This cultural familiarity with and expectation of copies, dupli-
cates, and fakes has been commented on extensively as part and parcel of a (post)colonial
engagement with modernity (see, e.g. Abbas, 2008; Bhabha, 1984; Wong, 2017). After 1991 and
the loosening of import duties in the wake of the nation’s programme of structural adjustments
and trade liberalization, Indians both enjoyed more imported goods, including imported copies.
Thus, broader experiences of consumption brought along in its wake a creeping suspicion about
precisely these new consumer opportunities. In a similar vein, the case of the Spurious Drugs
Kingpin represented the betrayal of the social contract that is at the heart of any commercial
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pharmaceutical transaction. The case of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin bore a family resemblance to
this longer history of copies and suspicion of purveyors. The middle-class call and response of
Indian broadsheet journalists and their audiences arguably made sense of this betrayal of the social
contract in precisely such terms.
In the story of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin, the middle classes’ misrecognition of their own
danger is a function of the merging with the local landscape of drugs circulation in Chennai with
the broader, if more abstract, landscape of ambivalence within otherwise urgent public health
messaged. Anxieties about drugs and danger of global health emerge as a character in this
Chennai story, as city residents struggle to make sense of the seemingly shocking and amoral
set of alleged activities at the heart of the story: the retail recirculation of relabelled expired drugs.
In trying to make sense of this, both middle-class journalists and their middle-class readers
disregard questions of their own unlikely proximity to cough syrup and energy tonics, let alone
pharmacies in notorious neighbourhoods of the city’s labouring classes. The apparent take-away
lesson is harder to swallow: the policing of drugs is not in service of public safety, but rather is
evidence that the city’s police act at the behest of pharmaceutical manufacturers. What the middle-
class journalists and readers mobilise to make sense of this episode is an already-circulating
pharmaceutical trope: the always-suspected counterfeit. What appears to be more the case is
a garden variety case of piracy: when distributors become manufacturers.
Of piracy, Dent (2016) suggests that when distributors become authors (or, in this case,
manufacturers) troubles start. And indeed it is precisely the doubling of distributors into authors
of drugs that produced the scandal under consideration. Insofar as this scandal has a resolution,
what seems to be put back into place is the ability of manufacturers to control both the authorship
of, and with it the proﬁt accruing to, their product. What is completely absent in this resolution,
however, is the matter of drug safety. In the place of public health certainties, we must confront
the ambiguity of the expired drugs at the heart of the story.
But this ambiguity is itself productive. Returning to the questions posed by the story of the kingpin,
what does it matter that the Indian middle-class consumer ventriloquizes global health discourse about
the dangers of fake drugs? The ambiguous safety status of expired, redistributed drugs provides an
opening for misrecognition; the misrecognition is itself a resolution. For health matters as considered
among aﬄuent Chennai-ites, the mis-recognition of the Spurious Drugs Kingpin as a player in the
duplicitous global market in health precipitates a dreadful question, itself impossible for drawing clear
lines or achievable outcomes: ‘In India, even if we are rich, arewe the haves?Or, arewe still the have-nots?’
Notes
1. In real terms quite a lot, but hardly a king’s ransom. At that point in time, the sum might have bought you two
decent used cars.
2. Around $20 million in 2010.
3. This was an income tax charge: V. Meenakshisundaram, Chennai vs Department of Income Tax on
19 August 2010. In this case, heard before the Income Tax Tribunal, Meenakshi Sundaram admitted that he
was using two properties for his business. The tribunal held that he could not classify them as ‘income from
house property’ head, when he was clearly using it for business purposes.
4. Vasantha Meena Enterprises vs Baskaran on 6 June 2011.
5. M/s. Meena Health Care (P) Ltd., Rep. By Its Managing Director V. Meenakshisundaram Vs the State.
6. V. Meenakshisundaram (MS) vs The Inspector of Police on 18 August 2010.
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